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much. I'm just supposing." Some of mentality amount to doings, such as imaginings and 
cases of considering or deliberating, but not all. In particular, supposing, believing, 
assuming, and presupposing seem not to be doings at all. They are, instead, states we find 
ourselves in rather than things we do. 
5. On p. 171, Alston claims that the concept of being a more firmly established practice 
"involves components such as (a) being more widely accepted, (b) having a more definite 
structure, (c) being more important in our lives, (d) having more of an innate basis, (e) 
being more difficult to abstain from, and (f) its principles seeming more obviously true." 
In light of (f), one may wonder whether there is a connection between Alston's emphasis 
on firmly established practices and egocentric rationality. The answer is, it depends on 
whose seeming is involved in (f), and what weight is assigned to each factor. In the case 
of Cedric, if it is Cedric's seeming that matters, and if the presence of (f) dominates all 
other conditions, then Alston's emphasis on fmnly established practices implies egocentric 
rationality. I doubt this is Alston's view, however; and in any case, this list is of little help 
without clarification of its members and some idea of how to weight each factor since it 
is clearly possible for conflict to obtain between them. 
6. Though Alston does not clarify the notion of coherence, it is common practice to 
assume that coherent beliefs are at least consistent. The difficulties come in trying to say 
what else besides consistency coherence involves. 
7. And theorists who prefer a view of propositional content on which these different 
sentences express the same proposition need to explain how it could have been an 
important epistemic achievement to find out that the sentences express the same proposi-
tion. Presumably, any such explanation will allow some epistemic status for beliefs 
involving the first sentence that might not be possessed by beliefs involving the second 
sentence. 
8. I am assuming that the full reasons for each claim will not be exhausted by a 
deductively valid argument with either claim as the conclusion. It is hard to imagine an 
adequate theory of rationality that would deny this claim, but I won't defend it here. 
9. For arguments that (8) is false, see, e.g., Henry Kyburg, "Conjunctivitis," in Epistemology 
and Inference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); and Richard Foley, The 
Theory ofEpistemic Rationality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989. Pp. v + 213. 
ELEONORE STUMP, St. Louis University. 
Over the course of several books, Richard Swinburne has undertaken to 
produce a systematic philosophical defense of Christianity. While there are 
other philosophers who are engaged in defending one or another piece of 
traditional Christian philosophical theology, Swinburne is the only one to 
have embarked on a systematic treatment of all the major doctrines of the 
religion, and it is a mammoth undertaking. He began with a trilogy: The 
Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason. This 
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volume, Responsibility and Atonement, is the first of a subsequent tetralogy, 
which will cover atonement, trinity and incarnation, revelation, providence 
and the problem of evil. (By now, the volume on revelation has also ap-
peared.) The labor of a large, ongoing project of this sort is clearly revealed 
in an endearing but utterly implausible claim Swinburne makes several times 
in Responsibility and Atonement: "The strongest desire of all, which influ-
ences us to fail to fulfill our obligations ... is the desire to rest" (p. 12). Both 
those who are inclined to attack Christianity and those who mean to defend 
it can be grateful for Swinburne's unresting efforts, which are yielding a lucid 
exposition of Christian doctrine and a philosophically coherent defense of it. 
Responsibility and Atonement, as its title implies, focuses on the distinc-
tively Christian doctrine of Christ's atonement for human sin. The first part 
of the book, which comprises well over half the volume, is focused on re-
sponsibility. It begins with a detailed consideration of the nature of moral 
goodness and the connection between responsibility and free will. It also 
examines merit and reward, gUilt and forgiveness; and it completes the dis-
cussion of responsibility with a chapter entitled "Man's Moral Condition,"l 
which examines human proneness to wrongdoing. Swinburne intends this part 
of the book to be independent of any theological assumptions and to be of 
general interest to philosophers concerned with ethics or issues involving free 
will. In the second part of the book, Swinburne introduces the theological 
views characteristic of Christianity-that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly good God, creator of the world, who became incarnate in Christ, 
and so on. Swinburne argues that these theological views make a difference 
to our understanding of human obligation and human proness to wrongdoing, 
and he lays out his understanding of the resulting account of obligations to 
God and of sin. Then he is finally ready to address the doctrine of the 
atonement, and the last three chapters of the book are devoted to atonement, 
sanctification, and heaven and hell. 
Clearly, Swinburne is covering an enormous range of material in this short 
book; in consequence many of his discussions are necessarily sketchy. So, 
for example, in the chapter on free will, Swinburne argues against compati-
bilism and for incompatibilism, but Daniel Dennett's defense of compatibi-
lism is dismissed in a short footnote, and the defense of incompatibilism 
provided by Peter van Inwagen, who might have been a valuable ally for 
Swinburne here, is discussed and rejected in just a couple of paragraphs in a 
note. Swinburne espouses the principle of alternative possibilities, which he 
takes to be essential to incompatibilist free will, without any serious discus-
sion of the substantial literature challenging that principle. There is very little 
examination of Harry Frankfurt's work, for instance, and none of John Martin 
Fischer's. Finally, although the connection between reason and free will is 
important to Swinburne's position, Susan Wolf's views on this subject, well 
argued and opposed to Swinburne's, aren't mentioned at all. 
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Furthermore, no doubt also in order to expedite discussions that otherwise 
would have been considerably more lengthy, Swinburne relies heavily on 
unargued intuitions which not all his readers will share. To take just one 
example out of very many, Swinburne says, "Do we not think that the coward 
who does an heroic act out of character is greatly to be praised for it, praised 
for rising above his habitual reactions and natural inclinations? He is worthy 
of praise more than the man to whom the heroic act is almost second nature" 
(p. 40). But consider former Governor Jerry Brown. On who knows what 
impulse, at one point in his life he left his usual round of politics and joined 
Mother Teresa, tending the dying in India; after that brief episode, he went 
back to his usual concerns. Certainly, Brown is an example of someone who 
does a heroic act out of character, and so on Swinburne's views Brown is 
more worthy of praise than Mother Teresa, to whom by now heroic acts of 
this sort are no doubt second nature. But not everyone will see things Swin-
burne's way here. 
Finally, the brevity of the book makes for some problems also when it 
comes to the history of philosophy and Christian tradition. Swinburne makes 
many references to the work of philosophers and Christian thinkers from 
earlier periods; his erudition is impressive and his willingness to engage with 
historical thinkers is exemplary. But because he is covering so much in such 
a short space, he cannot give historical figures the attention they deserve; and 
so this side of his book is sometimes frustrating. For example, he castigates 
Aquinas for holding a view more commonly associated with Calvin, that the 
people who wind up in hell have been predestined, or reprobated, by God to 
be there. Swinburne says that for Aquinas the doctrine of predestination 
"means that God foreordains the salvation of certain men chosen for no prior 
merit of theirs-Le., he programmes them in advance to do such good works 
as will merit salvation .... [But] if all and only those who are saved are 
programmed in advance to be saved, then those who are lost will be so as a 
result of not being programmed, Le., they will have been reprobated; and I 
have argued that a good God will not reprobate" (p. 193). Whatever exactly 
the correct description of Aquinas's account of predestination is, this cannot 
be it, although Aquinas sometimes writes loosely, in ways which can give 
rise to this impression. Aquinas defends at length the claim that God is 
timeless; therefore, on Aquinas's account, God cannot foreordain anything or 
program anyone in advance. In fact, strictly speaking, temporal predestina-
tion of any sort is not possible for a timeless God. 
The ethics Swinburne expounds in the first part of the book is largely 
Kantian, as Swinburne himself explains (see, e.g., p. 35). He elaborates the 
Kantian foundation of his ethics by reference to "normal human beliefs" (p. 
14) or "commonsense morality" (p. 22), though the sociological base for the 
intuitions invoked by such phrases seems a good deal narrower than the 
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phrases themselves would suggest. Commonsense morality, for example, is 
supposed to be the warrant for the claim that "Perhaps I have an obligation 
to save one life by paying $5, a second life by paying $5; but after a time, 
when I have given a certain proportion of my income over that time, I have 
done my bit. More than that is supererogatory" (p. 22). The moral principle 
implicit here is indeed common in the circles in which many of us move but 
seems to have been rarer, for example, among the poor villagers of Ie Cham-
bon, who on their own account felt it morally obligatory to help Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany even to the point of risking their own lives.2 
A great deal more could profitably be said about Swinburne's methodology 
and conclusions in the first part of the book, but in this short review I will 
concentrate just on the second part, on Swinburne's account of the atonement. 
On Swinburne's view, atonement is necessary for the removal of guilt con-
sequent on wrongdoing in general and sin in particular; and he takes atone-
ment to consist at least in repentance and apology, and usually also in 
reparation and penance (p. 81). Forgiveness of the sort which removes guilt 
is not possible without atonement, although it is possible for the victim of 
wrongdoing to forgive without requiring reparation and penance in addition 
to repentance and apology (p. 85). God undoubtedly could forgive human sin 
without requiring reparation and penance, but "it is good that if we do wrong, 
we should take proper steps to cancel our actions ... as far as logically can be 
done" (p. 149). And so God chooses not to forgive sin without reparation and 
penance, too. The problem then becomes this: what possible penance could 
human beings give to God? God himself makes this penance available to 
human beings in the life and death of Christ, Swinburne says. 
He thinks that the best way to understand Christ's atonement is as a sacri-
fice. The idea of a sacrifice to God is that "God takes something valuable as 
a gift of reconciliation whose benefits he will often share with worshippers-
like, to use a humble modem analogy, the box of chocolates which one gives 
to one's host, who then offers one in return a choice from the box. The 
sacrifice of Christ is then Christ giving the most valuable thing he has-his 
life; both a lived life of obedience to God, and a laid-down life on the 
Cross-as a present to God, whose benefits will flow to others" (p. 152). This 
picture is somewhat complicated by the doctrine that Christ is also fully God, 
as Swinburne recognizes: "insofar as Christ is God himself, he cannot offer 
a sacrifice to himself. The sacrifice model has then to be somewhat trans-
formed. God makes available the sacrifice (of himself), but it is we who have 
to offer it .... Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to 
recognize what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly 
gift which another has made available for him to offer as his sacrifice. On 
this model Christ's death has no efficacy until men choose to plead it in 
atonement for their sins" (p. 153). And, he adds, "if, as some Reformers have 
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claimed, God forgives men before men seek him, God would not be taking 
men seriously .... Rather, the sinner has to use Christ's death to get forgive-
ness" (p. 153). We use Christ's death to get forgiveness when we plead it 
before God in this way: "'Our life is a failure,' we may now say. 'We have 
made a mess of the life which you gave us, we have made no reparation of 
our own for our sins, ... But we have been given a perfect life, not owed to 
you, 0 God. We offer you this life instead of the life we should have 
led ... Take its perfection instead of our imperfection. We are serious enough 
about our sins to repent and apologize and to offer you back an offering of 
this value as our reparation and penance'" (pp. 154-55). 
Swinburne himself raises and answers several questions at this point. One 
important question is this: couldn't a human being make reparation and pen-
ance for herself, or for herself and others? Why does God have to provide 
reparation and penance for us? The answer, Swinburne says, is that "[W]e 
ordinary men, even if we had not sinned ourselves, would owe so much to 
God anyway ... that the little extra we could do for our brethren in this way 
would not amount to very much. Only when I owe you nothing can I give 
you something" (p. 157). But why, we might wonder, would the penance and 
reparation have to be made by God's becoming incarnate? U[T]he point of 
reparation is to restore the status quo as nearly as possible. Likewise, the best 
penance is that which more than makes it up to you in the respect in which 
I harmed you .... Since what needs atonement to God is human sin, ... appro-
priate reparation and penance would be made by a perfect human life, given 
away through being lived perfectly" (pp. 156-57). 
What are we to say about this account of the atonement? 
Someone might object at the outset that Swinburne has simply misunder-
stood the nature of forgiveness. On Swinburne's account, the wronged per-
son's ability to forgive is dependent on the decisions of the wrongdoer; if the 
wrongdoer decides not to make atonement, his victim can't forgive him. But 
contrary to Swinburne, it seems evident that forgiveness is entirely within 
the power of the wronged person. We can forgive people who still aren't 
speaking to us; we can forgive our parents long after they are dead; and we 
can be commanded to forgive our enemies (as distinct from being commanded 
to forgive those people who were our enemies but have now repented, apolo-
gized, made reparation, and brought a present). 
Nonetheless, an objection of this sort is mistaken, I think. We speak of 
forgiveness ambiguously. Sometimes-especially when we think about for-
giveness from the point of view of the person wronged-we mean by 'for-
giveness" the wronged person's putting away all resentment or wrath with 
respect to the wrongdoer. In that sense, it is perfectly possible for a victim 
to forgive the person who has wronged her no matter what he decides to do. 
But, on the other hand, sometimes-especially when we think about forgive-
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ness from the point of view of the person committing the wrong-we mean 
by 'forgiveness' the restoration and healing of a broken relationship. When 
a husband asks his wife for forgiveness, he wants the marital relationship 
whole again. If his wife were to put away all her angry feelings towards him 
but divorce him anyway, with serenity, he would feel with bitterness that she 
hadn't forgiven him at all. In this sense of 'forgiveness,' the restoration of a 
broken relationship, forgiveness isn't entirely within the power of the 
wronged person; it does depend on decisions and actions of the wrongdoer 
as well, at least on his repentance and confession. If we understand Swinburne 
to be discussing forgiveness only in the second sense, this objection evaporates. 
A more serious worry concerning Swinburne's account, in my view, has to 
do with the way he identifies the problem atonement is meant to solve. Human 
sin produces a breach in the relationship between human beings and God, a 
breach which the atonement somehow heals. One way to see the problem 
here is to suppose that it lies with human beings and consists in finding a 
way of restoring to righteousness wills which are both free and (as Jeremiah 
says) "desperately wicked." On Swinburne's view, however, the problem lies 
with God, who requires reparation and costly penance, which is out of the 
reach of human beings and which the atonement then provides. This view 
raises a number of questions. 
In the first place, Swinburne quite rightly says that when human wrongdo-
ing produces a breach in a relationship with another human being, the rela-
tionship sometimes requires reparation and penance, as well as repentance 
and apology, in order for the person who has been wronged to return to the 
relationship as it was before. This claim seems as right as it does because 
human wrongdoing does often result in harm to other human beings, harm 
which we feel the wrongdoer ought somehow to undo. But it isn't clear that 
human wrongdoing harms God, or that an omnipotent, omniscient deity could 
be harmed at all. And if God isn't harmed by human wrongdoing, then why 
would there by any need or desire on his part to have a costly present as 
penance for human wrongdoing (as distinct from a need or desire to provide 
penance, on the part of human wrongdoers)? 
Furthermore, while it is clear in cases of human wrongdoing that wrong-
doers sometimes have an obligation to provide penance as well as reparation, 
it isn't clear that sinners could have any obligation to provide penance to 
God. On Swinburne's view, only when one person owes another nothing can 
she bring him a present. But in that case human beings can't bring God any 
presents, since (as Swinburne says) they owe him so much anyway, even 
without taking sin into account. But if human beings can't bring God a 
present, if they can't provide penance, it seems that a good God wouldn't 
require it of them.3 
And there is a further worry in the case of the penance provided by the 
atonement. In this case, the penance in.cludes the torture and destruction of 
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an innocent human being. If, as Swinburne claims, God is not morally obli-
gated to demand penance but decides to require it anyway, how are we to 
understand a good God's deciding to require torture and destruction when (on 
Swinburne's own account) God could get what he wants without it? 
Moreover, even in the case in which wrongdoing causes harm to its human 
victim and the wrongdoer can make reparation and innocuous penance, al-
though we find the victim who insists on penance morally acceptable, we 
admire her if she is willing to forego it. In the parable of the prodigal son, 
the son, who has seriously wronged his father, returns home intending to say 
to his father "I have sinned against heaven and before you." But before he 
can express his repentance to his father, his father runs to him and embraces 
him with kisses; and although he finally does make his speech of repentance, 
his father rushes to restore the broken relationship without requiring any repa-
ration whatsoever, to say nothing of asking for a present. The father in the parable 
seems to many a model of parental love. Would we feel the same way about him 
if the story were rewritten on Swinburnian lines, so that forgiveness were granted 
only in response to repentance, apology, reparation, and penance? 
Finally, there is some difficulty in seeing exactly what Swinburne takes the 
penance constituted by the atonement to be. Is the death of Christ an essential 
part of the costly present offered to God in the atonement or not? Sometimes, 
as in the passages quoted above, it seems as if the costly present consists 
essentially just in the blameless life of Christ, to which his death on the cross 
is a perhaps foreseen but nonetheless accidental accompaniment. On this 
view, nothing essential to the atonement would have been lost if God had 
responded positively to Christ's prayer in Gethsemane and had prevented the 
crucifixion (as he could easily have done by a host of means ranging from 
the prosaic to the miraculous). A view of the atonement of this sort would 
raise some difficult questions and would put Swinburne at odds with the New 
Testament and Christian tradition. Sometimes, however, Swinburne seems in 
harmony with that tradition: in summing up his account of the atonement, he 
speaks of the "redeeming death" of Christ and of the way in which we use 
"Christ's life and death" (my emphases) as a means of removing sin (p. 161). 
But if Christ's passion and death are an essential part of the atonement, then 
it is hard to see how they constitute a costly present to God, the cosmic 
equivalent of the box of chocolates offered along with reparation. How could 
any decent person, let alone a perfectly good God, take the humiliation, 
mangling, and destruction of an innocent person as a valuable present which 
helps to make up for previous wrongdoing on the part of others? And, of 
course, the problem only becomes worse when we bring in the doctrine of 
the trinity: now the costly present we offer to God is the torture and death of 
his own incarnate self. Why would God find this a valuable gift which con-
stitutes our penance for wrongs done to him? 
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That serious worries of this sort can be raised about Swinburne's theory of 
the atonement is in a certain sense the best indicator of the excellence of this 
book. When Anselm wrote his treatise on the atonement, he thought that 
nothing which Christian tradition had bequeathed him about the atonement 
was worth discussing at any length, and perhaps he was right. His own theory 
of the atonement, which has a family resemblance to Swinburne's, is not 
nearly so well worked out, or so worthy of critical examination, as Swin-
burne's is. By trying to produce a detailed and philosophically coherent 
account of the atonement which is true to biblical texts and Christian tradi-
tion, on the one hand, and our moral intuitions, on the other, Swinburne has 
done us all a great service. Philosophers and theologians interested in the 
atonement must grapple with the issues raised by Swinburne's account.4 
NOTES 
1. Braving the trends of the age in this as in other respects, Swinburne has decided to 
retain the use of 'man' for the species and 'he' as the non-gender-specific pronoun. Bravery 
is in general admirable and appealing, but misplaced, I think, in this case. 
2. See, for example, Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1985). In summing up, Hallie says, "Trocme and This [the two pastors who 
led the work of rescuing Jews in Le Chambon) believed that if they failed to protect those 
[Jewish refugees] in Le Chambon, they, the ministers, would share the guilt of the evil 
ones who actually perpetrated the harmdoing" (p. 283). 
3. In correspondence, Swinburne has agreed with this point but said that "God provides 
[penance] for us in order that we may be able to bring it." It is true that if God provides 
human beings with a costly present they otherwise would not have been able to provide 
themselves, then they may have some obligation to use it and God may have some right 
to require that they do so. On this position, then, Christ's atonement is not a response to 
some preexisting moral need on the part of human beings but rather creates a moral 
obligation which was not there before. This conclusion, which strikes me as infelicitous, 
only sharpens the worry raised in the next paragraph. 
4. I am grateful to Norman Kretzmann and Richard Swinburne for helpful questions 
and comments on an earlier draft of this review. 
Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. 236. $65.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper). 
GAREY B. SPRADLEY, Grove City College. 
In this historically rich but theologically controversial book, Richard Swinburne 
discusses the grounds for believing that some book or creed or act conveys 
revealed truth in propositional form, devoting well over half the book to a 
discussion of the Christian revelation. 
Part I is a primer in philosophy of language designed as a prolegomenon 
